《通胀削减法案》和支柱二如何塑造欧盟竞争力的未来中英文对照

编译：思迈特财税国际税收服务团队

French President Macron is coming to Washington, D.C., this week to ask President Biden the question on the minds of European leaders: “Why did you do this to us?”

法国总统马克龙本周将来到华盛顿特区，向拜登总统询问欧盟领导人心中的问题。“你为什么要这样对我们”？

When President Biden signed the Inflation Reduction Act into law, he put many European companies at a disadvantage unless they move production to the United States because of the law’s renewable energy tax credits for American-produced goods. President Macron will attempt to negotiate European companies’ access to these credits.

当拜登总统签署《通胀削减法案》成为法律时，它使许多欧盟公司处于不利地位，除非它们将生产转移到美国，因为该法案对美国生产的商品有可再生能源税收抵免。马克龙总统将试图就欧盟公司获得这些抵免进行谈判。

President Macron and prominent EU leaders have voiced their displeasure with the domestic requirements and have debated retaliatory trade restrictions. Not only is their ally putting European companies at a disadvantage during a war and high inflation, but at a macro level, European leaders fear an industrial exodus from the EU to the United States because of the war, protectionist credits, and higher European energy prices. EU officials have called the American credits an “existential challenge” to Europe’s economy.

马克龙总统和欧盟著名领导人已经表达了他们对国内要求的不满，并就报复性贸易限制进行了讨论。不仅他们的盟友在战争和高通胀期间使欧盟公司处于不利地位，而且在宏观层面上，欧盟领导人担心由于战争、保护主义抵免和欧盟能源价格上涨，工业会从欧盟流向美国。欧盟官员称美国的抵免是对欧盟经济的“生存挑战”。

Unfortunately for the future of EU competitiveness, “why did you do this to us?” is the wrong question. European leaders should instead be asking themselves, “why is the EU so vulnerable to losing major industries, and is the EU prepared for future subsidy wars with other countries?”

不幸的是，对于欧盟未来的竞争力来说，“你们为什么要这样对我们”？这是一个错误的问题。欧盟领导人应该反过来问自己，“为什么欧盟如此容易失去主要产业，欧盟是否为未来与其他国家的补贴战争做好准备”？

Fear of Industrial Exodus

对工业外流的恐惧

At first glance, it is easy to blame Russia and high energy prices for making Europe less competitive. With the price of energy spiking all over Europe, producers are finding it harder to make a profit. With an extra tax incentive to move production to the U.S., some companies might be tempted to shift production out of the EU.

乍一看，很容易责怪俄罗斯和高能源价格使欧盟失去竞争力。随着整个欧盟的能源价格飙升，生产商发现更难盈利。在将生产转移到美国的额外税收激励下，一些公司可能会受到诱惑，将生产转移到欧盟以外的地方。

However, these scapegoats are an example of recency bias and conveniently ignore two fundamental issues with EU competitiveness.

然而，这些代罪羔羊是近因效应的一个例子，并方便地忽略了欧盟竞争力的两个基本问题。

The first is the simple fact that the five largest economies in the EU have less competitive corporate tax codes than the United States. Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands all rank below the U.S. in corporate tax competitiveness based on Tax Foundation’s 2022 International Tax Competitiveness Index. This means that even without higher wartime energy prices and the recent protectionist tax credits, the United States still offers companies a friendlier business climate in which to invest. The uncompetitive European rankings are due in part to poorly designed tax policies such as digital services taxes, windfall profits taxes, poor treatment of capital investment, and other complexities.  

首先是一个简单的事实，即欧盟5个最大经济体的公司税法竞争力低于美国。根据税收基金会的2022年国际税收竞争力指数，德国、法国、意大利、西班牙和荷兰的公司税收竞争力排名都低于美国。这意味着，即使没有更高的战时能源价格和最近的保护主义税收抵免，美国仍然为公司提供了一个更友好的投资商业环境。欧洲排名缺乏竞争力的部分原因是设计不当的税收政策，如数字服务税、暴利税、资本投资处理不当以及其他复杂问题。

The second is that European policymakers openly admit that fairness, rather than competitiveness and growth, is their primary objective when designing tax policy. Some have gone as far as to question why economic growth is necessary at all and have proposed alternative economic theories based on declining growth.

其次，欧盟的政策制定者公开承认，在设计税收政策时，公平，而不是竞争力和增长，是他们的首要目标。有些人甚至质疑为什么经济增长是必要的，并提出了基于增长下降的替代经济理论。

However, when companies plan capital-intensive investments, they are looking to do so in economic environments likely to produce a return on their investment. Growth is an essential part of that calculation.

然而，当公司计划资本密集型投资时，他们希望在可能产生投资回报的经济环境中进行投资。增长是这种计算的一个重要部分。

In addition, if the EU is considering any form of strategic autonomy, its ability to do so cannot hinge on laws passed by the U.S. Congress. This autonomy will require principled tax policy that supports growth and investment in the EU.   

此外，如果欧盟正在考虑任何形式的战略自主权，那么其能力不能取决于美国国会通过的法律。这种自主性将需要有原则的税收政策，支持欧盟的增长和投资。  

Therefore, higher energy prices and the protectionist tax credits in the Inflation Reduction Act may serve as the final reasons companies decide to move production across the Atlantic. But it is rare for entire industries to leave almost overnight because of foreign tax credits. The type of industrial exodus that European leaders currently fear comes from fundamentally uncompetitive tax systems and policies that punish economic growth.

因此，更高的能源价格和《通胀削减法案》中的保护主义税收抵免可能成为公司决定将生产转移到大西洋彼岸的最终原因。但是，整个产业几乎在一夜之间因为外国税收抵免而离开的情况是很罕见的。欧盟领导人目前担心的工业外流类型来自于根本上没有竞争力的税收制度和惩罚经济增长的政策。 

The European Response

欧盟的回应

Since August, European leaders have debated how to respond to the Inflation Reduction Act provisions specifically and to American protectionism more broadly. A new U.S.-EU task force was created to specifically discuss the problematic tax provisions in detail.  

自8月以来，欧盟领导人一直在辩论如何具体应对《通胀削减法案》的规定，以及更广泛地应对美国的保护主义。一个新的美国-欧盟特别工作组已经成立，专门详细讨论有问题的税收规定。

President Macron represents the first option for the EU. If he can convince the Biden administration to grant the EU an exception to the domestic content requirements, it would alleviate the concerns of European producers. It is yet to be seen if President Biden has the political will or the legal authority to grant such an exception without a U.S.-EU trade deal in place before the Act takes effect on 1 January 2023.

马克龙总统代表了欧盟的第一个选择。如果他能说服拜登政府给予欧盟一个国内含量要求的例外，那么这将缓解欧盟生产商的担忧。在该法案于2023年1月1日生效之前，如果没有美欧贸易协定，那么拜登总统是否有政治意愿或法律权力给予这种例外，还有待观察。

Another option could be to file a dispute at the World Trade Organization （WTO） and resume the tit-for-tat trade war started under the Trump administration that has recently been rebalanced under President Biden. However, in the context of Russia’s war on Ukraine and the need for Western unity, this option seems unlikely. This is despite “$200 billion of the $367 billion total subsidies not being WTO compliant” according to Olivier Becht, French Minister for Foreign Trade and Attractiveness.

另一个选择可能是向世界贸易组织 （WTO） 提出争端，并恢复在特朗普政府领导下开始的针锋相对的贸易战，这种贸易战最近在拜登总统领导下得到了重新平衡。然而，在俄乌战争和西方国家需要团结的背景下，这种选择似乎不太可能。法国对外贸易和吸引力部长Olivier Becht称，尽管“3670亿美元的补贴总额中有2000亿美元不符合世贸组织的规定”。

A third, and likely best option for the EU, would be to implement principled pro-growth tax policies that boost overall European competitiveness. Meaningful reform ideas include lowering corporate tax rates towards the OECD average and providing full expensing for capital investment. This is, unfortunately, the least likely outcome due to a lack of political will.  

第三，也可能是欧盟的最佳选择，是实施有原则的有利于增长的税收政策，提高欧盟整体竞争力。有意义的改革想法包括将公司税率降低到OECD的平均水平，并为资本投资提供全额费用。不幸的是，由于缺乏政治意愿，这是最不可能的结果。

Finally, a fourth option floated by the French government is to replicate the Inflation Reduction Act with a “Buy European” subsidy regime of its own. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen asked for a similar mechanism in her State of the Union speech in September called the European Sovereignty Fund. This is despite Commissioner Dombrovskis warning that “subsidy races tend to be expensive and inefficient” and Member States like the Netherlands and Sweden cautioning against subsidies for fear of trade retaliation from other trading partners.

最后，法国政府提出的第4个选择是用自己的“购买欧盟”补贴制度来复制《通胀削减法案》。欧盟委员会主席Ursula von der Leyen在她9月份的国情咨文中要求建立一个类似的机制，称为欧盟主权基金。尽管委员Dombrovskis警告说，“补贴竞争往往是昂贵和低效的”，而且荷兰和瑞典等成员国因担心其他贸易伙伴的贸易报复而告诫不要提供补贴。 

Pillar Two and Subsidy Competition  

支柱二和补贴竞争  

If the EU decides to implement a “Buy European” subsidy regime, there are two important aspects for policymakers to consider.

如果欧盟决定实施“购买欧盟”的补贴制度，那么政策制定者需要考虑两个重要方面。

The first is how many financial resources will be needed to win a subsidy war, not only against the United States, but also against China which massively subsides state industries. There’s a question of whether the EU has the resources to win such a war, and even if it does, how the EU would raise such funds.

首先是需要多少财政资源来赢得一场补贴战争，不仅是针对美国，还有针对大规模补贴国有产业的中国。有一个问题是，欧盟是否有资源来赢得这样一场战争，即使有，欧盟将如何筹集这些资金。

The second is the possible adoption of Pillar Two in the EU and its interaction with EU State aid rules. By setting a minimum 15 percent corporate tax rate, Pillar Two curtails some forms of tax competition. What this means in practice is that countries face less pressure to compete for investment by adjusting their tax rates and are incentivized to use other policy measures, such as subsidy regimes, instead. In other words, Pillar Two “solves” part of fiscal competition while creating another.

第二是欧盟可能采取的支柱二，以及它与欧盟国家援助规则的互动。通过设定最低15%的公司税率，支柱二遏制了某些形式的税收竞争。这在实践中意味着，各国在通过调整税率来竞争投资方面面临的压力较小，而被激励使用其他政策措施，如补贴制度。换句话说，支柱二在“解决”部分财政竞争的同时，也制造了另一种竞争。

Unlike countries such as the United States or China, the EU has fairly strict State aid rules that prohibit unfair government subsidies for national industries. In a world where the EU has adopted Pillar Two, or at least in the five largest EU economies, policymakers will have to carefully design their subsidy regimes to remain compliant with EU rules knowing that their competitors do not face similar constraints.

与美国或中国等国家不同，欧盟有相当严格的国家援助规则，禁止政府对国家产业的不公平补贴。在欧盟采用支柱二的世界里，或者至少在欧盟5大经济体中，政策制定者将不得不仔细设计它们的补贴制度，以保持遵守欧盟的规则，知道他们的竞争对手不会面临类似的约束。

One way the EU might combat this is a recently approved mechanism that allows the European Commission to identify foreign subsidies that distort the EU’s internal market and take redressive measures. However, this regulation has yet to come into effect and would likely not apply to subsidies that foreign countries use for products sent to non-EU markets.

欧盟可能打击这种情况的一个方法是最近批准的一个机制，该机制允许欧盟委员会识别扭曲欧盟内部市场的外国补贴，并采取补救措施。然而，这项规定尚未生效，可能不适用于外国向非欧盟市场产品使用的补贴。

Policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic should value the benefits of principled pro-growth tax policy and rules-based free trade. The U.S. and EU need to find common ground in wartime to boost investment in renewable energy sources and break away from Russian energy reliance. Principled, pro-growth tax policy, not protectionist subsidy wars, should lead the way.

大西洋两岸的政策制定者应该重视有原则的促进增长的税收政策和基于规则的自由贸易的好处。美国和欧盟需要在战时找到共同点，促进对可再生能源的投资，摆脱对俄罗斯能源的依赖。有原则的有利于增长的税收政策，而不是保护主义的补贴战争，应该引领潮流。

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