UTPR：在加拿大的有害影响？

编译：思迈特财税国际税收服务团队

OVERVIEW

概要

This commentary examines harmful effects the 136 country Pillar Two minimum tax project (see footnote 1) could have on Canadian workers and communities.

本评论性文章探讨了136个国家的支柱二最低税率项目（见脚注1）可能对加拿大工人和大众产生的有害影响。

CONTEXT

背景

Imagine the shock, indignation, and apprehension if a Canadian party were to receive a letter from the Canada Revenue Agency, purportedly based on some new Canadian antiavoidance tax laws, claiming taxes — perhaps in amounts that would bankrupt the party — owed by the party's father and a sibling to one or more other countries (and to be clear not to Canada) on income they derived from those other countries and in which the party contacted has absolutely no interest (either directly or indirectly).

想象一下，如果一个加拿大当事人收到一封来自加拿大税务局（CRA）的信，据称是根据加拿大新的反避税法，要求该当事人的父亲和兄弟姐妹向一个或多个其他国家（显然不是加拿大）缴纳他们从这些国家获得所得的税款，而该当事人完全没有从这些国家获得利益（无论是直接还是间接）。

The party probably would dismiss it as just another of the endless stream of fraudulent/scam communications received every day — that is, until a follow-up was sent by registered mail or other means that the party could no longer just dismiss.

当事人可能会将其视为每天收到的无穷无尽的欺诈/诈骗通信中的另一个，也就是说，直到通过挂号信或其他方式发出后续通知，当事人才不能再随便拒绝。

And the party would then determine that the demand could be enforced against the party even if the party could not secure a binding undertaking from the father or sibling that they would reimburse the party.

然后，当事人将确定，即使当事人无法从父亲或兄弟姐妹那里获得具有约束力的承诺，即他们将偿还当事人的费用，该要求也可以对当事人强制执行。

ENTER PILLAR TWO

进入支柱二

Well, that unthinkable situation must unfortunately now be directly transposed to the affairs of certain Canadian subsidiaries of U.S.- or other foreignbased multinationals and indirectly to employees of such Canadian subsidiaries and the local communities in which they operate as a result of a worldwide OECD led crusade against the tax planning of multinationals that have at least EUR 750 million of gross revenue.

不幸的是，这种不可想象的情况现在必须直接转化为美国或其他外国跨国公司在加拿大的某些子公司的事务，并间接转化为这些加拿大子公司的员工和他们运营所在的当地大众，这是OECD领导的针对总收入至少为7.5亿欧元的跨国公司纳税规划的全球改革的结果。

What Is the Exact Problem?

确切的问题是什么？

A profitable corporation formed in and operating exclusively in Canada (“Canco”) which has always incontrovertibly paid fully and timely every dollar of tax it owes on its profits, may receive from the Canada Revenue Agency a substantial tax bill not related to Canco's own profits (the tax on which all agree has been fully paid) but rather determined and calculated by reference to profits earned in a foreign country (say, Bermuda or the United States or both) by a corporation (say, “Bermco”) owned by the same parent (“USco”) that owns Canco or by the parent itself.

一家在加拿大成立并只在加拿大运营的盈利公司（Canco），一直无可争议地全额及时缴纳其利润应缴的每一美元税款，可能会从加拿大税务局收到大量的税单，这些税单与Canco自己的利润（所有同意全额缴纳的税款）无关，而是参照拥有Canco的同一母公司（USco）或母公司本身在外国（如百慕大或美国或两者）获取利润来确定和计算。

Canco's assets will be depleted — perhaps leading to layoffs of its Canadian employees or jettisoning of expansion plans or insolvency, etc. — by a tax bill related not to its own profits but rather to the profits of a Bermuda corporation which Canco does not own directly or indirectly, or to the profits of its parent USco. In either case, Canco has no interest in such foreign profits, yet may be made to pay tax on those foreign profits. This is totally different than Canco being assessed tax on income of a foreign subsidiary it owns under Canada's controlled foreign affiliate/foreign accrual property income rules, akin to the U.S. CFC/Subpart F rules or under the prime Pillar Two rule — the Income Inclusion Rule.

Canco的资产将被耗尽，也许会导致其加拿大员工的裁员或放弃扩张计划或破产等，因为税单不是与它自己的利润有关，而是与Canco不直接或间接拥有的百慕大公司的利润或其母公司USco的利润有关。在这两种情况下，Canco在这些外国利润中没有任何利益，但却可能被要求为这些外国利润缴税。这与Canco根据加拿大受控外国子公司（CFC）/外国应计财产所得规则，类似于美国的CFC/Subpart F规则，或根据主要的支柱二规则：收入纳入规则，对其拥有的外国子公司所得进行纳税完全不同。

How Will This Problem Arise?

这个问题将会如何出现呢？

This will arise under new Canadian law, now being drafted, sponsored on October 8 of last year by Canada and 135 other countries — through the OECD (as Pillar Two 15% Minimum Tax) and touted by Canada's Department of Finance in its spring budget as fighting international tax avoidance and ending a “race to the bottom” tax competition between countries. 

这将在加拿大的新法律下出现，该法律目前正在起草中，去年10月8日由加拿大和其他135个国家通过OECD发起（作为支柱二15%最低税率），并由加拿大财政部在春季预算中吹捧为打击国际避税和结束国家间的"逐底"税收竞争。

But what international tax avoidance has Canco engaged in? NONE. What race to the bottom is Canada engaged in, with an average corporate tax rate of 27%? NONE.

但是，Canco从事了什么国际避税活动？没有。加拿大的平均公司税率为27%，它从事了什么竞争？没有。

Therefore, it is difficult to see any nexus between the purposes of Pillar Two and the affairs of Canco. That's because, viewed rationally, there is none. Only when the OECD's propaganda is stripped away and the devil in the details is examined does this illogical, inappropriate result come into focus.

因此，很难看到支柱二的目的和Canco的事务之间有任何联系。这是因为，理性地看，没有任何关系。只有当OECD的宣传被剥去，细节中的魔鬼被审视时，这种不合逻辑的、不恰当的结果才会成为焦点。

The Underlying Factors?

基础因素？

There are three interrelated factors in the USco-Bermco-Canco illustration, above.

在上述美国公司-百慕大公司-加拿大公司的示例中，有三个相互关联的因素。

First, Pillar Two invites tax havens like Bermuda to impose a 15% tax on its companies owned by large multinationals. If it does, the saga ends. If it doesn't — on to factor two.

首先，支柱二招致像百慕大这样的避税天堂对其大型跨国公司拥有的公司征收15%的税款。如果它这样做了，这个故事就结束了。如果它不这样做——就进入第二个因素。

That (factor two) is the basic Pillar Two rule (the Income Inclusion Rule) that, absent the first factor (Bermuda levelling a 15% tax), the parent of Bermco — USco — should pay to the U.S. government 15% of the income of Bermco. But the United States has not adopted the Pillar Two rule — even though the Biden Administration favours it — because of opposition in Congress (namely from Democratic Senator Joe Manchin who vetoed it in the recent “Inflation Reduction Act,” as discussed in the Portman article cited in footnote 3).

这（因素二）是基本的支柱二规则（收入纳入规则），即如果没有第一个因素（百慕大征收15%的税款），Bermco的母公司——USco——应该向美国政府缴纳Bermco所得的15%。但美国没有采用支柱二规则——即使拜登政府赞成——因为国会的反对意见（即民主党参议员Joe Manchin在最近的《通胀削减法案》中否决了该规则，如脚注3中引用的Portman文章中所讨论的）。

The United States has a separate rule (the 2017-enacted Global Intangible Low-Taxed Income (GILTI) rule) which will impose a 10.5% U.S. tax on USco in respect of Bermco's income. But that 10.5% falls short of the requirements of Pillar Two (it has paid only 10.5% not 15%) and that brings us to the third and fatal factor of Pillar Two and the depletion of Canco.

美国有一个单独的规则（2017年颁布的全球无形低税所得（GILTI）规则），该规则将对美国公司就Bermco的所得征收10.5%的美国税款。但这10.5%没有达到支柱二的要求（它只缴纳了10.5%而不是15%），这使我们想到支柱二的第三个致命因素和Canco的耗损。

That (third factor) is Pillar Two's bizarre notion — which is being legislatively adopted by Canada — that if a foreign corporation (here Bermco) that is the subsidiary of another foreign corporation (here USco) has earned income in its foreign country but between those two foreign countries a full 15% tax has not been paid, the shortfall (4.5% of Bermco's income — or perhaps greater per footnote 5) can be claimed against a third company (Canco) by the country where Canco is based just because Canco is owned by the parent (USco) of the foreign company (Bermco) that earned the foreign income. 

这（第三个因素）是支柱二的奇怪概念——加拿大正在立法采用——如果一个外国公司（这里是Bermco）是另一个外国公司（这里是USco）的子公司，在其外国获取了所得，但在这两个外国之间没有全额缴纳15%的税款，那么差额（Canco公司所得的4.5%，或者根据脚注5可能更大）可以由Canco公司所在的国家向第三家公司（Canco）索赔，仅仅因为Canco公司是由获得外国所得的外国公司（Bermco）的母公司（USco）拥有。

WHERE DOES THIS LEAVE THE CANADIAN PARTY?

这让加拿大当事人情何以堪？

This surreal and essentially untenable result will, upon enactment, be part of Canadian law and govern Canco, unless (1) Canco can successfully sue Canada for unlawfully expropriating or confiscating its property under the transparent guise of taxing Canco on phantom imaginary non-existent income or (2) Canco can invoke tax treaty protection.

这一超现实的、基本上站不住脚的结果在颁布后将成为加拿大法律的一部分，并制约着Canco，除非（1）Canco能够成功地起诉加拿大在对Canco虚构的不存在的所得征税的透明幌子下非法征用或没收其财产，或者（2）Canco能够援引税收协定保护。

The expropriation (confiscation) notion merits a bit of discussion. It stems from but is different from comments made by Dr. Catherine Anne Brown at a recent Canadian Tax Foundation seminar on Pillar Two respecting whether foreigninvestor rights under international investment agreements might be a basis for foreign investors to challenge Pillar Two. 

征用（没收）的概念值得讨论一下。它源于但不同于Catherine Anne Brown 在加拿大税收基金会最近一次关于支柱二的研讨会上发表的评论，即外国投资者在国际投资协议下的权利是否可以成为外国投资者挑战支柱二的依据。

Here, the question is whether a domestic Canadian taxpayer has any right under Canadian domestic law to challenge the Canadian government for levying a tax under domestic law based on Pillar Two tax.

这里的问题是，根据加拿大国内法，加拿大国内的纳税人是否有权利质疑加拿大政府根据支柱二税收的国内法征税。

Dr. Brown looked at a foreign investor in Canada who claims, under an international investment agreement, that a Canadian tax law (here one related to Pillar Two) amounts to an indirect expropriation or confiscation of the investor's property. So this is dealing with a foreign party and an investment agreement and a claim against Canada. The focus here has no foreign claimant nor an investment agreement, but only a potential Canadian claimant and Canadian domestic law — hypothetically a Canadian corporation being levied tax by Canada under the UTPR because its foreign parent owed top-up tax but it had not adopted Pillar Two.

Brown博士研究了一个在加拿大的外国投资者，他根据国际投资协议，声称加拿大税法（这里是与支柱二有关的税法）相当于间接征用或没收投资者的财产。因此，这是在处理一个外国当事方和一个投资协议以及对加拿大的索赔。这里的重点是没有外国索赔人或投资协议，而只有一个潜在的加拿大索赔人和加拿大国内法——假设一家加拿大公司被加拿大根据UTPR征税，因为其外国母公司应缴补足税，但它没有采用支柱二。

The objective would be to have UTPR overturned as an invalid expropriation, under Canadian laws (without regards to any international law or treaty). Arguably, this is expropriation or confiscation because the Canadian subsidiary has no direct or indirect interest in the income of its foreign parent or foreign subsidiary of its foreign parent in respect of which Canada is claiming a payment from Canco.

其目的是根据加拿大法律（不考虑任何国际法或协定），将UTPR作为无效征用而被推翻。可以说，这是征用或没收，因为加拿大子公司在其外国母公司或其外国母公司的外国子公司所得中没有直接或间接的利益，而加拿大正就这些所得向Canco要求缴纳。

The statute under which Canada is making the UTPR claim may be called an income tax statute — but is it not a sham claim, because Canco has no interest and never will have an interest in the income on which the claim against Canco is based? Is it not pure expropriation or confiscation without compensation? Is Canco an innocent pawn in a massive hunt, orchestrated by OECD, for tax dollars?

加拿大提出UTPR要求所依据的法规可能被称为所得税法规——但这难道不是一种虚假的要求，因为Canco在对Canco提出要求所依据的所得中没有利益，而且永远不会有利益？这难道不是纯粹的征用或无偿没收吗？Canco是OECD策划的大规模猎取税款活动中的一只无辜的棋子吗？

Quite apart from any domestic law relief under the notion of expropriation is the question as o whether there is a tax treaty block. The notion is that, in the hypothetical UTPR issue discussed herein, Canco could claim exemption under Article Vll of the Canada-U.S. Income Tax Treaty, which says “the business profits of a resident of [the United States] shall be taxable only in [the United States] unless the resident carries on business in [Canada] through a permanent establishment situated therein.”

与征用概念下的任何国内法救济完全不同的是，是否存在税收协定的阻碍。这个概念是，在本文讨论的假想UTPR问题中，Canco可以根据《加拿大-美国所得税协定》第Vll条要求豁免，该条规定“[美国]居民的营业利润应只在[美国]纳税，除非该居民通过位于[加拿大]的常设机构在[加拿大]开展业务”。

That would seem to say Canada cannot apply the UTPR here. But can Canada argue as follows?

这似乎是说加拿大不能在这里适用UTPR。但加拿大是否可以这样辩解？

First, the assessed party under the Canadian Income Tax Act is the Canadian sub of the U.S. parent (and is not the U.S. parent) and it is only that Canadian sub that can ask a Canadian court to use a provision of the Canada-U.S. treaty to override the operation of the Income Tax Act.

首先，《加拿大所得税法》规定的被评估方是美国母公司的加拿大子公司（而不是美国母公司），只有该加拿大子公司才能要求加拿大法院使用加美协定的规定来推翻所得税法的实施。

However, not only is it generally understood that a treaty to which Canada is a party cannot affect the manner in which Canada can tax its own residents (here the Canadian sub), but that notion is specifically confirmed by Article XXIX(2) of the Canada-U.S. treaty.

然而，人们不仅普遍认为，加拿大作为缔约国的协定不能影响加拿大对其居民（这里是指加拿大子公司）征税的方式，而且这一概念在加美协定第XXIX（2）条中得到了具体确认。

Second, a totally different argument is that Canada is not simply/merely adding the profits of the U.S. sub (measured under usual Canadian tax accounting rules) to the usual taxable income base of the Canadian sub and applying the usual corporate tax rates, but instead it is mechanically calculating against the Canadian sub a claim which in substance is totally weird and different (and gives very different results) from the usual claim and is simply not contemplated by the treaty.

其次，一个完全不同的论点是，加拿大不是简单/单纯地将美国子公司的利润（根据加拿大通常的税务会计规则计量）计入加拿大子公司通常的应税所得税基，并适用通常的公司税率，而是机械地对加拿大子公司计算出一个实质上与通常的申报完全不同的申报（并给出非常不同的结果），而且根本不是协定所设想的。

Finally, the probability that, in our illustration, USco will make Canco whole does not reduce the inappropriateness of this aspect of the Pillar Two 15% minimum tax proposals, which elsewhere have been criticized as being against Canadian interests.

最后，在我们的示例中，美国公司将使加拿大公司得到补偿的可能性并没有减少支柱二15%最低税率建议的这一方面的不适当性，这些建议在其他地方被批评为有损加拿大的利益。

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

结论性建议

The issue discussed above is a significant part of the 180degree turn Canada is making from a 50year-old tax policy that sought by its design to foster Canada's economy by encouraging, through tax measures, both outbound and inbound investment.

上面讨论的问题是加拿大从50年的税收政策中180度大转弯的一个重要部分，该政策的设计旨在通过税收措施鼓励对外投资和对内投资，从而促进加拿大经济。

The imposition of Pillar Two taxes under either the prime Income Inclusion rule (referred to only briefly above) or the harmful UTPR discussed above is a far cry from the true and tested approaches adopted since the massive 1972 tax reform. This highlighted the essentially tax-free environment for outbound and the reasonably measured set of rules for inbound.

根据主要收入纳入规则（上文仅简要提及）或上文讨论的有害UTPR征收支柱二税款，与1972年大规模税制改革以来所采用的真正和经过测试的方法相去甚远。这突出了走出去的基本免税环境和引进来的合理计量的一套规则。

There is growing concern that this 180degree turn is simply not in Canada's interest — whether for the reasons discussed above or otherwise.

越来越多的人担心，这种180度的转弯根本不符合加拿大的利益，无论是出于上面讨论的原因还是其他原因。

温馨提示：非官方翻译，如有不同理解，请以英文版为准！